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ABSTRACT 
 
KRISTJEN B. LUNDBERG: Post-Racial America?: Racialization and Polarization of 
Policy-Related Judgments Following the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election 
(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne) 
 
 
The promise of a “post-racial” America signaled by the 2008 election of President 
Obama has gone unfulfilled. Using representative samples of the American electorate, 
Study 1 confirmed that those with stronger explicit and implicit anti-Black attitudes 
before the 2008 election voiced more negative policy-related judgments in July 2009 
(racialization hypothesis). Study 2 demonstrated that the difference in policy-related 
judgments between high-prejudice and low-prejudice respondents was increasing over 
time between May 2009 and July 2010 (polarization hypothesis). Both the racialization 
and polarization of policy-related judgments were mediated by more negative evaluations 
of Obama. Study 3 suggested that the particular pattern of mediation may be unique to 
the Obama administration. Particularly noteworthy is that the measure of policy-related 
judgments used refers to issues (e.g., the economy, health care) that naively should be 
uninfluenced by racial attitudes. These findings suggest that racial attitudes continue to 
play a substantial role in today’s political climate.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Welcome to the latest buzz word in the political lexicon, post-racial. It is 
what Senator Barack Obama signals in his victory speech in South 
Carolina when he tells of the woman who used to work for segregationist 
Strom Thurmond and now, knocks on doors for the Obama campaign… 
The post-racial era… is the era where civil rights veterans of the past 
century are consigned to history and Americans begin to make race-free 
judgments on who should lead them.” 
  
Daniel Schorr, NPR Senior News Analyst, January 2008 
 
 
The campaign for and 2008 election of Barack Obama as President of the United 
States was heralded by many as the beginning of a new era in U.S history and carried 
with it the promise of a post-racial America (for a review see Tesler & Sears, 2010). Yet, 
in the days immediately following the election, news reports indicated a surge in hate 
crimes against Black Americans (Associated Press, 2008 November 15), including 
vandalism, physical attacks, and even cross burnings. The alluring ideal of an election 
driven by “race-free judgments” was further dispelled as researchers verified the 
substantial impact that racial attitudes had played in the election outcome (Payne et al., 
2010; Pasek et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Piston, 
2010; Tesler & Sears, 2010). Though the election of the nation’s first Black president was 
certainly an important milestone in America’s racial history, the voting patterns of the 
American electorate in November 2008 continued to reflect an inveterate anti-Black 
prejudice. Analysis of these patterns led one team of researchers to estimate that the 
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elimination of anti-Black prejudice from the American electorate would have increased 
Obama’s margin of victory by 5.17 percentage points (Pasek et al., 2009). Or, as Payne 
and colleagues succinctly stated, “Mr. Obama was not elected because of an absence of 
prejudice, but despite its continuing presence” (Payne et al., 2010, p. 373). 
Just as individuals did not make race-free judgments about who should lead them, 
it is unlikely that they are now making race-free judgments about how they are being 
governed. Rather, it may be that racial attitudes are continuing to influence perceptions 
and evaluations of President Obama just as they did Candidate Obama and with 
substantial attendant consequences. One potential consequence, of particular interest to 
the research presented here, is that the racial lens through which Obama is viewed may 
result in the spillover of those racial attitudes from evaluations of Obama to evaluations 
of the policy issues with which he is associated. In effect, it may be that the continued 
accessibility and use of racial attitudes in evaluating Obama—and, by proxy, public 
policies—is leading to the racialization of even presumably nonracial issues (e.g., health 
care, the economy), such that knowing a person’s attitude toward Blacks may allow us to 
make a reliable prediction about how he or she views the performance of the government 
in addressing policy issues. Specifically, one might expect that those high in prejudice are 
more negatively evaluating President Obama and, thus, his administration’s policy 
decisions.  
Further, these evaluations are unlikely to remain static once formed. With regular 
exposure to new pieces of information via the media, social networks, and other outlets, 
those in the American electorate are frequently provided with the opportunity to update 
their evaluations of President Obama, public policies, and the general state of the country. 
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If racial attitudes are indeed leading to biased interpretations of Obama and his policies, 
one would expect that the subjectivity with which new information is assessed would 
lead to increasing polarization in the American electorate. For example, imagine that an 
individual’s evaluations of Obama and his policies (informed by his or her racial attitude) 
are somewhat negative. As that person learns about Obama’s actions (e.g., a new 
economic proposal or a speech outlining health care reforms), it is likely that the 
information will not be approached neutrally, but rather with the expectation of 
disagreement. When that person does, in fact, disagree with Obama’s stance or actions, 
doing so may not only reinforce an already negative assessment of him, but perhaps also 
make it stronger. Therefore, it is anticipated that, given the passage of time and the 
opportunity to accumulate subjectively construed information, one will see increasing 
polarization in the American electorate driven by racial attitudes, such that the difference 
in evaluations of Obama and his administration’s policies between those high and low in 
prejudice increases over time.  
The research presented here tests for evidence of such racialization and 
polarization. It is hypothesized that:  
H1a: Racial attitudes are predictive of judgments regarding purportedly non-racial 
policy issues that are strongly associated with President Obama’s administration, 
such that those with stronger anti-Black attitudes voice more negative policy-
related judgments. 
H1b: The relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments is 
mediated by evaluations of President Obama, such that stronger anti-Black 
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attitudes are predictive of more negative evaluations of Obama that are in turn 
predictive of more negative policy-related judgments. 
H1c: This pattern of relationships among racial attitudes, evaluations of Obama, 
and policy-related judgments is unique to the Obama administration given his 
status as the nation’s first Black president. 
 
H2a: Racial attitudes are predictive of a polarized pattern of change in policy-
related judgments over time, such that the differences in policy-related judgments 
between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks 
increases over time. 
H2b: This polarization itself (i.e., the differential rates of change in policy-related 
judgments) is mediated by evaluations of President Obama. 
 
Connecting Racial Attitudes, Perceptions of Obama, and Policy-Related Judgments 
Media and Public Perceptions 
Claims that racism is motivating criticisms of President Obama and his 
administration’s policies have been made repeatedly in the public domain. For example, 
in a September 2009 interview with NBC Nightly News, former President Jimmy Carter 
made the following statement: “I think an overwhelming portion of the intensely 
demonstrated animosity toward President Barack Obama is based on the fact that he is a 
black man… because of the belief of many white people, not just in the South but around 
the country, that African-Americans are not qualified to lead this great country” (as cited 
in Murray, 2009). These comments were made in the context of a discussion concerning 
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the then-recent actions of Representative Joe Wilson, who had yelled “You lie!” at the 
president during his nationally televised address to Congress on health care reform. 
Others concurred with former President Carter, opining that such an outburst on the floor 
of Congress would never have occurred with a White man in the presidency (Dowd, 
2009). However, Michael Steele, then chairman of the Republican National Committee, 
released a statement refuting the claim that such responses constituted racism, in which 
he said, “President Carter is flat-out wrong… This isn’t about race. It is about policy” (as 
cited in CNN, 2009; see also Parker, 2009).  
Similar charges of racism have been levied throughout Obama’s presidency, 
notably in response to the so-called “birther” movement, which called into question the 
true location of Obama’s birth, suggesting that he was actually born in Kenya and is not a 
U.S. citizen. One commentator called the birther movement “a proxy for racism that is 
unacceptable to articulate in more direct terms” (Thrush, 2009). And, responding to the 
birther controversy, PBS host Tavis Smiley predicted that the 2012 presidential race will 
be “the ugliest, the nastiest, the most divisive, and the most racist… in the history of this 
republic” (“The Last Word,” MSNBC, 2011). Still, others continue to insist that their 
disagreement with Obama is based on competing political ideologies and a lack of shared 
values, and some even claim that Obama himself may be fostering and exploiting the 
cries of racism for political gain (Forman, 2011). Thus, these denials of any racial 
undertones in criticism of President Obama’s policies and the assertion that the real 
disagreement lies in the substance of the debate are a frequent refrain. But, is the 
contention that race has nothing to do with it a reflection of reality? 
Theoretical and Empirical Support 
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Connecting racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama. Do racial attitudes 
affect how one evaluates Obama? A long-standing and substantial body of research 
suggests that they do. Information accessible at the time of judgment—whether 
unobtrusively or subliminally primed or chronically accessible—influences how one 
perceives and evaluates another person (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & 
Wyer, 1979; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh & Pratto, 1986). The activation and 
use of stereotypes, in particular, has garnered considerable attention, and researchers have 
repeatedly demonstrated that the same set of information may be processed and 
interpreted quite differently depending on the stereotype activated at the time of 
judgment. For example, individuals who have been nonconsciously primed with words 
related to the stereotype of Black Americans (e.g., afro, jazz, ghetto) are more likely to 
judge a race-unspecified target person as hostile (Devine, 1989; see also Lepore & 
Brown, 1997). Pictures of guns are more quickly and correctly categorized when 
preceded by pictures of Black rather than White men (Payne, 2001, 2006; see also 
Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, & Judd, 2002). And, participants primed with ape-related 
words (thereby activating the Black-ape association) judge police to be more justified in 
using violence against a Black suspect than a White suspect (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, 
& Jackson, 2008).  
Of course, the likelihood that stereotypes will be used in processing information 
about others is subject to certain constraints: Firstly and most obviously, the stereotype 
must be activated. While it was once thought that stereotype activation automatically 
occurred following category activation (e.g., encountering an outgroup member) due to 
shared cultural knowledge of stereotypes (Devine, 1989), subsequent research has 
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clarified that factors such as one’s existing level of prejudice may, in fact, moderate the 
extent to which negative stereotypes are activated in conjunction with categorical 
information (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003). Gawronski 
et al. (2003), for example, found that implicitly measured attitudes toward an ethnic 
minority group moderated the impact of category membership on the construal of 
ambiguous information and dispositional inferences made regarding a target individual. 
In other words, the relationship between encountering an outgroup member and forming 
a negative impression of that person was amplified by existing prejudicial attitudes. In 
fact, in Gawronski et al.’s research, those with negative implicit attitudes toward a group 
of people were more likely to form negative impressions about a member of that group 
regardless of their motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997). In 
regards to President Obama then, those who possess anti-Black attitudes may be more 
likely to access negative stereotypes about Black Americans when encountering 
information about him and to evaluate him according to those stereotypes.  
The evidence that racial attitudes are influencing evaluations of Obama has 
already began to accumulate. As mentioned previously, various research teams have 
documented the extent to which racial attitudes played a pivotal role in predicting voter 
behavior during the 2008 presidential election (Payne et al., 2010; Pasek et al., 2009; 
Greenwald et al., 2009; Piston, 2010; Tesler & Sears, 2010). Additionally, Hehman, 
Gaertner, and Dovidio (2011) demonstrated that explicit anti-Black prejudice predicts 
Whites’ negative evaluations of Obama’s job performance, as mediated by perceptions of 
Obama’s “un-Americanism.” And, Kosloff, Greenberg, Schmader, Dechesne, and Weise 
(2010) found that, for some participants, making their own racial identity salient was 
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sufficient to produce a greater likelihood of associating Obama with and endorsing 
political smears about him (e.g., being a Muslim, being a socialist). The salience of race 
during the 2008 election season and the initial years of Obama’s presidency has likely 
contributed to the chronic activation and accessibility of racial attitudes and stereotypes 
and, thus, an increased likelihood of their contribution to evaluations of both Obama and, 
by extension, the policy-related issues with which he is associated (see also Mendelberg, 
2008). 
Connecting racially-informed evaluations of Obama with policy-related 
judgments. Why, though, would these racially-informed evaluations of Obama spill over 
to influence policy-related judgments? Such hypothesized connections are easily derived 
from two existing sets of theories. The first is a general class of theories that make 
predictions about the need for evaluative or cognitive consistency. For example, Heider’s 
(1946, 1958) balance theory with its emphasis on the tendency to achieve balanced triads 
(for a review see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) predicts that a person who 1) dislikes Obama 
and 2) knows that Obama endorses a particular policy position must also 3) dislike that 
policy position in order to achieve a balanced triad. In short: If I do not like Obama, I am 
more likely to disagree with him. Within the parameters of balance theory, it is irrelevant 
where the dislike for Obama originated (i.e., whether it was motivated by racial attitudes 
or not). Contemporary theories of racism, on the other hand, can explain the relationship 
between disliking Obama and the policies with which he is associated while also 
accommodating the role of racial attitudes in predicting that relationship.  
One such theory is that of aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2004). Proponents of aversive racism theory posit that there is a clash between 
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the desire to adhere to social egalitarian norms and the negative feelings experienced 
toward members of a minority group. Because an individual may strongly desire both to 
be and to appear to others to be unprejudiced, they are likely to explicitly deny any 
negative feelings they may be experiencing toward an outgroup member. Nonetheless, 
these negative feelings may leak out, so to speak, as the individual discriminates in subtle 
ways and particularly in situations in which their behavior can be justified on the basis of 
non-racial factors. For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) found that White 
participants were significantly less likely to recommend a Black candidate than a White 
candidate for a job opening when the candidate possessed moderate qualifications, while 
no such discrimination occurred when the qualifications were less equivocal (i.e., clearly 
strong or weak). Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) extended these findings, 
demonstrating that racial attitudes moderated the effect, such that the discriminatory 
behavior in ambiguous circumstances was amplified for highly prejudiced participants. 
Thus, in the current context, an individual may experience negative feelings toward 
President Obama as a Black man and voice such disapproval, but—desiring both to be 
and to appear to be unprejudiced—may deny that the feelings are racially driven. Instead, 
the individual may attribute such feelings to, for example, disapproval over Obama’s 
handling of economic policy. In other words, it is likely far more acceptable to self and 
others to oppose Obama because of his policies rather than his race.  
The existing evidence for these hypothesized relationships among racial attitudes, 
evaluations of Obama, and policy-related judgments is thin. However, it is not non-
existent. Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg (2010), for example, have shown that 
implicit and explicit measures of racial prejudice completed in October 2008 each 
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uniquely predicted opposition to Obama’s health care reform plan one year later (see also 
Tesler & Sears, 2010). Interestingly, when the plan was attributed to former President 
Bill Clinton, no such effect was observed, bolstering the researchers’ claim that the 
opposition is driven by racial prejudice. 
 Polarization over time. Finally, what support is there for the idea that these 
policy-related judgments, informed by racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama, may 
polarize over time? Work derived from social judgment theory (for a review see Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993) exemplifies how attitudes may lead to biased evaluations of new 
information such that one’s attitude subsequently becomes more extreme. For example, 
in an experiment conducted by Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), participants who 
supported or opposed capital punishment rated attitude-congruent reports on capital 
punishment as more convincing and valid than attitude-incongruent reports. Further, they 
reported more extreme attitudes after reading the material (see also Houston & Fazio, 
1989). Therefore, in regard to the current political climate, as voters encounter new 
pieces of information regarding Obama and his policies, their racial attitudes may 
influence not only their construal of the information, but in doing so may also reinforce 
and subtly shift their policy-related attitudes to a slightly more extreme position. 
 
Though this review of the literature provides both a theoretical grounding for and 
compelling evidence regarding the racialization of American politics, it also reveals 
certain gaps in the present body of knowledge. Therefore, the research presented here 
seeks to build upon and expand the existing knowledge base in three key ways: Firstly, it 
directly tests the mediating effect of attitudes toward Obama on the relationship between 
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racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. As noted previously, existing research has 
experimentally demonstrated the negative effect of associating Obama with a policy plan 
(Knowles et al., 2010) and measured the impact of racial attitudes on agreement with 
Obama’s policy views. But, to my knowledge, there has not yet been a direct test of the 
extent to which evaluations of Obama is the mediating link. Secondly, the research 
presented demonstrates the extent of polarization in public opinion over time. As stated 
previously, it is unlikely that these evaluations of Obama and his policies remain static 
once formed, and it is a popular assertion that American politics have grown increasingly 
polarized. Therefore, the analyses presented assess the polarization phenomenon, as well 
as evaluate a potential causal mechanism for the effect. Thirdly and finally, a nationally 
representative sample of the American electorate is utilized (as did Tesler & Sears, 2010), 
which affords a rare opportunity to make inferences about these psychological processes 
in regards to the whole of the American electorate. The significance of this opportunity 
will be discussed more thoroughly in the succeeding section. 
The Predictive Validity of Implicit Measures 
 In addition to these aspirations of offering insight into the current political climate 
in the U.S., the current analysis seeks also to contribute to our understanding of the 
predictive validity of implicitly measured racial attitudes. Explicit prejudice is commonly 
defined as negative attitudes based on group membership that are consciously endorsed 
and reported. Implicit prejudice, in contrast, refers to associations that may occur 
spontaneously and without volition and whose influence on thought and behavior may not 
even be consciously recognized (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). Though explicit expressions of prejudice against Blacks are increasingly rare 
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occurrences in America (Bobo, 2001; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), the 
continued existence of racial disparities has led many (researcher and layperson alike) to 
doubt that prejudice itself has disappeared. Rather, it may be that racial attitudes are only 
partially captured by the verbal self-reports that purport to measure explicit prejudice 
(e.g., feeling thermometers, Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) racial resentment scale). Implicit 
prejudice, in contrast, is measured indirectly via procedures that do not require conscious 
introspection and are designed to capture automatic responses (e.g., the affect 
misattribution procedure [AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005], the Implicit 
Association Test [IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998]). Accordingly, these 
measures are generally considered to be free of the self-presentational concerns that 
plague explicit measures, and some have even posited that they represent psychological 
tendencies that are not accessible in consciousness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
 That measures of implicit prejudice are predictive of a diverse range of outcome 
measures is well established. To date, those outcome measures have included: less 
friendly non-verbal behavior in inter-group interactions (Dovidio, Kawakami, & 
Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; 
Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Hofmann, Gschwendner, Castelli, & Schmitt, 2008); biased 
judgments in social perception and judgment (Lambert, Payne, Ramsey, & Schaffer, 
2005; Maner et al., 2005; Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003; Bodenhausen, 1988); 
discriminatory mock hiring decisions (Ziegart & Hanges, 2005); policy evaluations 
(Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010); and helping behavior (Gabriel, Banse, & Hug, 2007). 
Further, particularly for socially sensitive topics, implicit measures may be more 
predictive of behavior and judgment than explicit measures (Greenwald, Poehlman, 
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Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Yet, despite the mounting body of evidence to support the 
predictive validity of implicit measures of prejudice, two issues concerning its use 
continue to be raised: (1) Do implicit measures predict consequential, real-world 
behaviors?; and (2) Do they have utility as predictors above and beyond what could be 
captured solely by explicit measures? 
Regarding the first issue, some critics of implicit bias research have argued that 
implicit measures may tap into only flawed approximations of prejudice (Arkes & 
Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock & Mitchell, 2008). One main thrust of their opposition is that such 
research does not have meaningful outcome measures. They claim that the artificiality of 
the lab setting, the purportedly inconsequential behavioral measures (e.g., eye blinking, 
hypothetical decisions), and the non-representative convenience samples of 
undergraduate students upon which researchers heavily rely all contribute to a lack of 
external validity. Or, as Tetlock and Mitchell (2008) stated, “Proponents [of implicit 
measures] have yet to provide compelling evidence for their assertions about the 
pervasiveness of unconscious bias and its behavioral consequences in early twenty-first 
century America” (pp. 12-13). Addressing such concerns and further establishing the 
validity of implicit measures could, therefore, be accomplished in part by demonstrating 
their ability to predict judgments and behaviors of substantial import in real-world (i.e., 
non-laboratory) settings. And, researchers have already begun devoting themselves to 
such a task. Much research conducted in the wake of the 2008 election with its focus on 
voting behavior (Payne et al., 2010; Pasek et al., 2009; Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-
Anan, & Nosek, 2009; Arcuri et al., 2008) certainly meets the criterion of assessing the 
impact of implicit measures in a consequential, real-world setting. The research presented 
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here adds to these findings by examining how implicit measures influence policy-related 
judgments (i.e., public opinion) and changes in those judgments over time. As public 
opinion and changes in public opinion are known to influence policymaking, it seems 
reasonable to consider these outcome measures as within the realm of consequential 
behaviors. For example, Page and Shapiro (1983) found that changes in public opinion 
were predictive of later congruent changes in policy (see also Manza & Cook, 2001). 
Therefore, the work presented may further underscore the importance and usefulness of 
implicit measures in predicting consequential behaviors in real-world settings.  
Regarding the second issue, a recurrent question concerning implicit measures has 
been whether they have predictive validity above and beyond that of explicit measures. 
Therefore, research that illuminates the unique predictive capabilities of implicit 
measures, by considering them in conjunction with explicit measures, can serve an 
important function by informing existing social cognitive theoretical models (Perugini, 
Richetin, & Zogmaister, 2010). As Perugini and colleagues argued, the issue is not 
whether implicit measures predict behavior, but rather “what type of behavior, under 
what conditions, for whom, and with what measure” (p. 255). By continuing to uncover 
information regarding the circumstances in which each class of measures appears to be a 
better predictor of behavior and by modeling the relationship between the measures (i.e., 
additive, interactive, etc.), the research community will attain a better understanding of 
both the utility of the measures and the nature of the constructs and processes being 
assessed. The analyses presented here, in particular, make their contribution by 
examining the unique effects of explicit and implicit prejudice in predicting public 
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political opinion, as well as their role in predicting how those opinions may change over 
time.    
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
STUDY 1: TEST FOR RACIALIZATION 
 
 
The goal of Study 1 was to provide an initial test of the racialization hypothesis 
by exploring the ability of measures of explicit and implicit prejudice to predict policy-
related judgments. It was expected that higher levels of prejudice (measured one to two 
months before the 2008 presidential election) would be predictive of more negative 
policy-related judgments nine to ten months later (Hypothesis 1a). Further, it was 
expected that evaluations of President Obama would mediate this relationship such that 
higher levels of prejudice would be predictive of more negative evaluations of Obama 
that were in turn predictive of more negative policy-related judgments (Hypothesis 1b).  
Method 
Respondents and Sampling 
The sample for this analysis was drawn from the American National Election 
Studies (ANES) 2008-2009 Panel Study. The respondents in these studies were a 
representative sample of the American electorate, and the data have been weighted to 
reflect then-current population demographics. Respondents were recruited by telephone 
using random digit dialing and compensated to complete one survey on the Internet each 
month. The first cohort completed surveys from January 2008 to September 2009, and 
the second cohort from September 2008 to September 2009. Those without Internet 
access were provided with a free web appliance and free Internet service for the duration 
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of the study. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents. (For further 
information on the sampling and recruitment techniques for this study, please see DeBell, 
Krosnick, and Lupia [2010].) Data from four separate “waves” of the ANES 2008-2009 
Panel Study were included in this study, and the retention rates for those waves are as 
follows: Of the 4,194 respondents who completed the recruitment interview, 2,586 were 
retained at Wave 9 (September 2008); 2,628 at Wave 10 (October 2008); 2,389 at Wave 
17 (May 2009); and 2,313 at Wave 19 (July 2009). After excluding those (a) who failed 
to complete one or more of the primary measures of interest and (b) for whom the 
appropriate sampling weight was not available, the final sample size was 1,842 
respondents. 
Measurements 
Outcome variable. The construct of policy-related judgments was 
operationalized using measures of perceived direction of the country, collected in July 
2009, in which respondents were asked to judge whether the country had improved or 
worsened since January 2009. Specifically, respondents were asked to compare the 
current state of five policy-related issues (i.e., our relations with foreign countries, the 
federal budget deficit, health care in the U.S., poverty in the U.S., and the economy) to 
how they were in January 2009. Responses were assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = much 
better, 5 = much worse), and a composite variable using these five responses (α = .72) 
was created such that higher numbers reflect perceived worsening of the country 
(weighted M = 3.57, SD = .59). It is notable that, on average, respondents believed that 
the country’s performance in terms of these policy-related issues had worsened since 
January 2009. (Question wordings and response options can be found in Appendix A.) 
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Using perceived direction of the country as a measure of policy-related judgments was 
deemed most appropriate for the analysis because it, although not explicitly referencing 
President Obama, still required that respondents assess how well the country had been 
performing since he had assumed the office of the presidency. Further, the issues on 
which respondents were being queried (e.g., health care) were presumably unrelated to 
their racial attitudes, which provided a critical opportunity to test the racialization 
hypothesis. 
Predictor variables. Explicit and implicit racial attitudes toward Blacks served as 
the primary predictors of interest. Implicit attitudes toward Blacks were measured in 
either September or October of 2008 (date of completion based on random assignment), 
using the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 
2005). In this procedure, participants completed 48 trials in which they were briefly 
presented with a photograph of the face of a White or Black man, followed by a Chinese 
ideograph. Each trial began with a fixation point, followed by a face presented for 75 ms, 
followed next by a pictograph for 250 ms, which was followed by a black and white 
noise mask. The mask remained on the screen until a response was registered. 
Respondents were instructed to judge whether each ideograph was pleasant or unpleasant 
while avoiding influence from the photos. The proportion of unpleasant responses to 
symbols as a function of Black primes (i.e., indicating higher prejudice) was considered 
the implicit attitude (weighted M = .45, SD = .28). Given its 0-1 scale, 0 can be 
interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Blacks. Additionally, the 
proportion of unpleasant responses to symbols as a function of White primes (weighted 
M = .37, SD = .26) was calculated in order that it could be included in the model as well 
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to control for a general tendency to respond with an unpleasant judgment. Thus, the 
proportion of unpleasant responses on Black trials while controlling for White trials can 
be interpreted as the unique effect of Black racial cues on evaluative judgments. 
Explicit attitudes toward Blacks were represented by a composite of single-item 
measures of warm/cold feelings toward Blacks (as a difference score in warm/cold 
feelings toward Blacks and warm/cold feelings toward Whites), sympathy for Blacks, 
admiration for Blacks, and perceptions that Blacks have too much political influence (α = 
.62). All measures were taken in September or October 2008. The composite was coded 
and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were 
maximally positive toward Blacks (weighted M = .53, SD = .17). (Question wordings and 
response options can be found in Appendix A.) 
Mediator variable. Evaluations of President Obama was represented by a 
composite of measures of liking for Obama, emotional responses (anger, hope, fear, and 
pride) to Obama, happiness that he won the election, and various job approval measures 
(e.g., how he is handling his job as president, the economy, the war in Iraq, etc.) (α = 
.97). All measures were taken in May 2009. The composite was coded and standardized 
to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally approving of 
Obama (weighted M = .43, SD = .25). (Question wordings and response options can be 
found in Appendix A.) 
Control variables. In order to test the unique effects of explicit and implicit 
racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic control 
variables were included in the analyses.1 These included:  
                                                          
1Note that previous reports on this research cited the use of two additional control variables: political party 
affiliation and political ideology. After careful consideration, it was determined that those measures should 
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1. Gender: This measurement was collected in January 2008. It was dummy-coded 
such that 0 represents males and 1 represents females. 
2. Level of education: This measurement was collected in January 2008. In this 
analysis, there were five dummy-coded variables representing level of education, 
one each for less than high school, high school graduate, some college, college 
graduate, and graduate work. Each of these was entered into the model, except for 
“less than high school,” which served as the reference group. 
3. Income:  This measurement was collected in January 2008. In this analysis, there 
were seven dummy-coded variables representing household income level, one 
each for those who declined to give their income, less than $25,000, $25,000-
39,000, $40,000-59,000, $60,000-84,000, $85,000-175,000, and more than 
$175,000. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than 
$25,000,” which serves as the reference group. 
4. Age: This measurement was collected in January 2008, but represents the 
participant’s age on Election Day 2008. Given that the minimum voting age is 18, 
it was centered at 18 years of age. 
Sampling Weights 
This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to 
correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the 
cumulative late panel weight for Wave 19 (July 2009) was used, because it is applicable 
to the use of data collected from Wave 9 (September 2008) onward through Wave 19, 
and is therefore most appropriate for the data used in this analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be removed from this and subsequent analyses. If the primary question of interest is the contribution of 
racial attitudes to political views on policy-related issues, a disservice is done by also including political 
views as a predictor and thereby potentially obscuring important findings. 
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Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that attitudes toward Blacks are predictive of 
policy-related judgments in the current political context, perceived direction of the 
country was regressed simultaneously on both explicit and implicit attitudes toward 
Blacks, as well as the full set of control variables, with the selected weight applied. 
Explicit prejudice was significantly predictive of more negative judgments regarding the 
perceived direction of the country (B = .98, SE = .08, t = 11.89, p < .0001), and implicit 
prejudice was, as well (B = .20, SE = .06, t = 3.25, p = .001). (See Figure 1.) In other 
words, those with more negative explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks were more 
likely to perceive the country as having worsened on these policy-related issues since 
January 2009. These findings provide initial evidence that issues that naively should be 
uninfluenced by attitudes toward Blacks are racialized in the current political context.    
In order to test the hypothesis that there was a significant indirect effect of racial 
attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Obama, two 
additional weighted regression analyses were conducted and then the Monte Carlo 
Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM; see MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 
2004) was utilized to test the significance of the indirect effect.2 Specific calculations 
were made through use of a web utility provided by Selig and Preacher (2008). First, the 
evaluations of Obama composite was simultaneously regressed on both explicit and 
implicit attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted. Both 
                                                          
2Note that previous reports on this research cited the use of an SPSS macro developed by Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) to test the significance of the indirect effect via a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure. It 
was subsequently discovered that the macro was incompatible with the use of sampling weights. Therefore, 
it was determined that weighted regression analyses should be conducted and the parameter and standard 
error estimates subjected to the MCMAM procedure. The MCMAM simulates random draws from the 
sampling distributions of  and  and uses them to generate a sampling distribution of the product of  and 
 from which a confidence interval for the indirect effect estimate can be calculated. If the values within 
the confidence interval do not contain zero, there is evidence to support a significant indirect effect. 
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explicit prejudice (B = .56, SE = .03, t = 16.70, p < .0001) and implicit prejudice (B = .11, 
SE = .02, t = 4.36, p < .0001) were found to be uniquely and significantly predictive of 
more negative evaluations of Obama. (See Figure 1.) In other words, those with more 
negative explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks were more likely to evaluate 
Obama negatively. Second, perceived direction of the country was simultaneously 
regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes, evaluations of Obama, and the full set of 
control variables, and appropriately weighted. Evaluations of Obama were significantly 
predictive of more negative policy-related judgments (B = 1.33, SE = .05, t = 27.43, p < 
.0001). However, when controlling for evaluations of Obama, explicit prejudice, though 
still significant, decreases in magnitude (B = .24, SE = .08, t = 3.18, p = .002), and 
implicit prejudice (B = .05, SE = .05, t = 1.05, p = .29) fails to achieve significance as a 
predictor. (See Figure 1.) 
Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM procedure indicated 
that the indirect effects of both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks on perceived 
direction of the country through evaluations of Obama were significant. For explicit 
attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.75 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.64 
to 0.85. For implicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.14 had a 95% 
confidence interval of 0.08 to 0.21. Thus, the analyses revealed that evaluations of 
Obama mediated the relationships between both explicit and implicit racial prejudice and 
perceived direction of the country. 
Testing Model Assumptions 
In fitting the models described above, it was assumed that the residuals were 
normally distributed. A visual inspection of residual distribution plots for each of the 
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three regression models fit revealed no flagrant departures from normality. It also was 
assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals. In order to test this 
assumption, scatterplots of the sets of residuals by the predicted values and by the main 
predictors of interest (i.e., explicit and implicit racial attitudes—and, evaluations of 
Obama, as appropriate) were created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly 
even distribution of the residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the analyses were consistent with the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity. 
Discussion 
These findings suggest that racial attitudes were predictive of public opinion on 
policy-related issues (e.g., health care, the economy, etc.) such that those who held more 
negative attitudes toward Blacks prior to the 2008 election were also likely to make more 
negative judgments regarding the perceived direction of the country approximately six 
months into the Obama administration. What is particularly noteworthy about these 
results is that the measure of perceived direction of the country was composed of policy-
related items that, for the most part, have historically had nothing to do with racial 
attitudes (as opposed to other policy-related issues such as crime or affirmative action, 
which have long been considered proxy measures of racial attitudes [Hurwitz & Peffley, 
1997; see Sears, van Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997]). Further, the relationships 
between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments were mediated by evaluations of 
Obama. These results provide initial support for the racialization hypothesis, the idea that 
racial attitudes are informing attitudes toward Obama and that these racially-informed 
evaluations are spilling over to influence judgments on policy-related issues.  
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Ruling Out an Alternative Interpretation 
It is possible that the mediating role played by evaluations of Obama was not 
unique to President Obama as a Black American, but rather may have extended to 
evaluations of other prominent Democrats. In order to rule out this alternative hypothesis, 
a single-item measure of liking for Hillary Clinton measured in May 2009 was utilized. 
Responses were originally assessed on a 7-point scale (0 = Like her a great deal, 6 = 
Dislike her a great deal). They were re-coded and standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 
can be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Clinton (weighted M = 
.45, SD = .35). While a single-item measure may not be considered ideal, it nevertheless 
provides the best opportunity afforded by this data set to contrast the mediating role of 
evaluations of Obama with evaluations of another prominent Democrat. (Question 
wording and response options can be found in Appendix A.) 
The sample size for the current analyses was 1,841. The same analysis procedures 
outlined previously, in which weighted regression analyses and the MCMAM were 
utilized, were again followed. First, perceived direction of the country was regressed 
simultaneously on both explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks, as well as the full 
set of control variables, with the selected weight applied. As before, explicit prejudice 
was significantly predictive of more negative judgments regarding the perceived direction 
of the country (B = .99, SE = .08, t = 11.94, p < .0001), and implicit prejudice was, as 
well (B = .19, SE = .06, t = 3.24, p = .001). Second, evaluations of Obama and 
evaluations of Clinton were independently regressed on both explicit and implicit 
attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted. In the case of 
Obama, as before, both explicit prejudice (B = .56, SE = .03, t = 16.70, p < .0001) and 
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implicit prejudice (B = .11, SE = .02, t = 4.36, p < .0001) were found to be uniquely and 
significantly predictive of more negative evaluations. In the case of Clinton, explicit 
prejudice (B = .58, SE = .05, t = 12.36, p < .0001) and implicit prejudice (B = .08, SE = 
.03, t = 2.31, p = .02) were also found to be uniquely and significantly predictive of more 
negative evaluations. Third, perceived direction of the country was simultaneously 
regressed on both explicit and implicit attitudes, evaluations of Obama, evaluations of 
Clinton, and the full set of control variables, and appropriately weighted. Evaluations of 
Obama remained significantly predictive of more negative policy-related judgments (B = 
1.34, SE = .06, t = 20.82, p < .0001), while evaluations of Clinton were not significantly 
predictive of policy-related judgments (B = -.01, SE = .05, t = -.19, p = .85). Additionally, 
explicit prejudice, though still significant, decreased in magnitude (B = .24, SE = .08, t = 
3.24, p = .001), and implicit prejudice (B = .05, SE = .05, t = 1.04, p = .30) failed to 
achieve significance as a predictor. 
Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM essentially replicated 
the previous finding, indicating that the indirect effects of both explicit and implicit 
attitudes toward Blacks on perceived direction of the country through evaluations of 
Obama remained significant even when accounting for the influence of attitudes toward 
Clinton. For explicit attitudes, the indirect effect point estimate of 0.75 had a 95% 
confidence interval of 0.64 to 0.87. For implicit attitudes, the indirect effect point 
estimate of 0.14 had a 95% confidence interval of 0.08 to 0.21. However, the analyses 
failed to find support for evaluations of Clinton as a mediator of the relationship between 
racial attitudes and policy-related attitudes. For explicit attitudes, the indirect effect point 
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estimate of .01 had a 95% confidence interval of -.06 to .05. For implicit attitudes, the 
indirect effect point estimate of .001 had a 95% confidence interval of -.01 to .01.3  
Thus, liking for Hillary Clinton, another prominent Democrat, did not mediate the 
relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. This finding provides 
further support for the idea that the unique racial lens through which Obama as a Black 
American is perceived may be allowing racial attitudes to inform responses to the current 
administration’s actions and policies. 
                                                          
3The same diagnostic tests as conducted in the previous analysis were conducted on these data, with the 
same conclusions drawn: The analyses appeared to be consistent with the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity. 
  
CHAPTER 3 
 
STUDY 2: TEST FOR POLARIZATION 
 
 
 Having established initial support for the racialization hypothesis by 
demonstrating that Obama may serve as a mediating link between racial attitudes and 
policy-related judgments, attention was then turned to the second set of hypotheses 
regarding the polarization of these judgments. Study 2 assessed whether both explicit and 
implicit racial attitudes were uniquely predictive of a polarized pattern of change in 
policy-related judgments over time. It was expected that the differences in policy-related 
judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks 
would increase over time (Hypothesis 2a) and that these differential rates of change in 
policy-related judgments (if observed) would be mediated by evaluations of President 
Obama (Hypothesis 2b). To evaluate these hypotheses, a series of weighted multilevel 
and single-level regression models were fit, testing for evidence of mediation using the 
MCMAM procedure employed previously. 
Method 
Respondents and Sampling 
The sample for this analysis was drawn from both the ANES 2008-2009 Panel 
Study and the ANES 2010 Panel Recontact Survey. From the ANES 2008-2009 Panel 
Study, data were drawn from the same four “waves” included in Study 1: Wave 9 
(September 2008), Wave 10 (October 2008), Wave 17 (May 2009), and Wave 19 (July 
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2009). Regarding the ANES 2010 Recontact Survey, of those respondents who 
completed any portion of the 2008-2009 Panel Study, a subset was identified as eligible 
for recontact. Those respondents were re-contacted by ANES affiliates in June and July 
of 2010 and asked to complete an additional survey on a variety of political topics. Of the 
original 4,194 respondents who completed the 2008-2009 Panel Study, 1,571 respondents 
completed the 2010 Recontact Survey.4 (For further information on the sampling and 
recruitment techniques for the 2008-2009 Panel Study and the 2010 Recontact study, 
please see DeBell, Krosnick, and Lupia [2010] and DeBell, Hutchings, Jackman, and 
Segura [2010].) For this analysis, after excluding those (a) who failed to complete at least 
one of the three measures of the outcome variable, (b) who failed to complete one or 
more measures that serve as predictor variables in the present analysis, and (c) for whom 
the appropriate sampling weight is not available, the final sample size for this analysis 
was 2,138 respondents with a total of 5,582 observations. 
Measurements 
Outcome variable. The primary outcome variable was again a measure of 
perceived direction of country (i.e., improving or worsening), which was collected at 
three time points following the 2008 election: May 2009, July 2009, and July 2010. As 
described previously, participants were asked to compare the current state of five policy-
related issues (i.e., our relations with foreign countries, the federal budget deficit, health 
care in the U.S., poverty in the U.S., and the economy) to how they were in January 2009. 
Responses were assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = much better, 5 = much worse). (The 
                                                          
4It should be noted that these 1,571 respondents did not set the upper limit for the sample size. A multilevel 
modeling approach can incorporate missing observations for the outcome variable, whereas more 
conventional methods cannot. Under the assumption that the data are missing at random, as long as a 
respondent has completed the outcome measure at least once, that respondent can be included in the sample 
(see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
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question wording and response options were exactly the same at each of the three time 
points. See Appendix A.) For each time point, a composite variable using these five 
responses (α’s > .70) was created such that higher numbers reflect perceived worsening 
of the country. On average, the respondents in this sample believed, at each of these time 
points, that the country was slightly worse than it was in January 2009 (see Table 1). 
Predictor variables. Explicit and implicit racial attitudes toward Blacks again 
served as the primary predictors of interest, represented by the same measures used in the 
previous analysis. To remind, both measures were adapted to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can 
be interpreted as those who were maximally positive toward Blacks.  
Time also was considered a predictor variable in these analyses. It was coded such 
that 0 represented the initial measure taken in May 2009 and each two-month interval 
was considered a single unit. Therefore, May 2009 was coded as 0, July 2009 as 1, and 
July 2010 as 7. Therefore, 0 can be interpreted as perceived direction of the country in 
May 2009 (i.e., where participants “began” in their trajectory, at least as far as these data 
allowed). 
Mediator variable. Disapproval of Obama also was represented by the same 
measure used in the previous analysis. To remind, the composite was coded and 
standardized to a 0-1 scale such that 0 can be interpreted as those who were maximally 
approving of Obama. 
Control variables. As before, in order to test the unique effects of explicit and 
implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic 
control variables were included in subsequent analyses. These included gender, level of 
education, income, and age, and were coded as described previously. 
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Sampling Weights 
This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to 
correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the 
cross-sectional weight for Wave 17 (May 2009) was used. The use of a multilevel model 
presents challenges in the selection of appropriate weight(s) in that weights may be 
specified at both Level 1 (observations) and Level 2 (person). In a hierarchical multilevel 
model, the relationship between the Level 1 and 2 weights is a bit clearer conceptually. 
Take the example of students nested within schools: The Level 2 weights would be 
selected to account for the probability of a school being selected, while the Level 1 
weights would be selected to account for the conditional probability of a student being 
selected given that the school was selected, as well as potentially rescaled to standardize 
the magnitude of the weight across clusters (see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2006; 
Carle, 2009; Pfeffermann et al., 1998). The extension to longitudinal multilevel models is 
less clear. At both levels, it is the person in which we are interested and that person’s 
ability to represent a proportion of the American electorate with his or her responses. 
Additionally, the weight of a person’s response to a measure inputted at Level 1 is almost 
wholly redundant with the weight of that person’s response to a measure inputted at 
Level 2. Therefore, it was determined that the selected weight be specified at Level 2 
only.5 
Exploratory Analyses 
Given that repeated measures of perceived direction of the country were collected 
from the same individuals, it was assumed that these data required the use of multilevel 
                                                          
5Additional analyses were conducted in which the Wave 17, Wave 19, and recontact cross-sectional 
weights were specified at Level 1, keeping the Wave 17 cross-sectional weight specified at Level 2. A 
similar pattern of results emerged. 
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modeling to account for the dependencies in the data. Preliminary data analyses 
supported this assumption. A random-effects ANOVA model (or null model) was fit to 
perceived direction of the country (see Table 2). The resulting intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC) of .61, which is calculated by dividing the between-person variance 
estimate by the total variance estimate (̂/	̂ 
 ), indicated that 61% of the 
variance in perceived direction of the country could be attributed to between-person 
differences. The ICC also can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of dependence 
within the data (i.e., the existence of between-person differences also implies a 
dependence in the observations within-person). Viewed from this perspective, the ICC 
indicated that, perceived direction of the country scores were correlated .61 within any 
given individual. This result indicated a high level of dependence in the data and 
bolstered the decision to employ a multilevel modeling approach. 
Additionally, before proceeding to the full analysis, it was appropriate to 
determine the proper specification of the growth model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To 
assist in making such decisions, an unconditional growth model was fit to perceived 
direction of the country, in which time was the only predictor. The results indicated that 
there was significant variability among both the intercepts (̂) and slopes (̂). In other 
words, the respondents varied significantly in their initial values on the perceived 
direction of the country measure, as well as in the trajectories that their responses 
followed over time. Despite the non-significant fixed effect of time (p = .36), these 
results suggested that the multilevel model should include random effects components for 
both the intercepts (i.e., initial values of perceived direction) and the slopes (i.e., the 
predicted rate of change in perceived direction over time). This decision was bolstered by 
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a visual inspection of a sample of individual model-implied trajectories for rate of change 
of perceived direction of the country over time (see Figure 2), which also indicated 
significant variability in intercepts and slopes. 
The unconditional growth model also produced a significant (positive) covariance 
between the intercepts and slopes (̂).This covariance was standardized into a 
correlation by dividing by the product of the standard deviations (̂/	̂  ̂), 
which resulted in a correlation of 0.311. This statistic indicates that the higher one’s 
initial value, the greater one’s slope. In other words, the worse that a respondent believed 
the country to be in May 2009, the more likely that respondent would be to report that the 
country had worsened even more on subsequent survey dates.   
Finally, the unconditional growth model indicated that, after accounting for the 
effect of time, the residual (within-person) variance was reduced, but remained 
significant (see Table 2). Approximately 20% of the variance within an individual’s 
scores could be explained by the passing of time. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Testing for Racialization and Polarization 
In order to observe the differing effects of explicit and implicit racial attitudes 
when considered both independently and simultaneously, as well as their incremental 
explanatory value above and beyond that of the control variables, four separate multilevel 
models were initially fit in addition to the null model and the unconditional growth model 
described previously (see Table 2). Model 1 included time and all of the demographic 
control variables as predictors. Models 2 and 3 built on Model 1 by adding explicit or 
implicit racial attitudes, respectively, as a predictor, while Model 4 assessed the effects of 
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explicit and implicit racial attitudes simultaneously. Model 1 served as a point of 
comparison for each of the three models that followed, allowing for the incremental value 
of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes to be assessed. In each of Models 2, 3, and 4, 
the underlying question being addressed remained the same: Did racial attitudes predict a 
polarizing rate of change in policy-related judgments over time such that the differences 
in policy-related judgments between those with more positive and more negative attitudes 
toward Blacks increased over time? Thus, in each of those three critical models, the 
parameter estimates for one or both measures of racial attitudes and for the interaction of 
the racial attitudes measures with time were of greatest interest. However, it should be 
noted that Model 4 provided the most conservative test of the hypotheses in that it 
assessed the unique predictive power of both explicit and implicit attitudes above and 
beyond what could be accounted for by the alternative measure of racial attitudes or by 
demographic characteristics. 
Mediation Analyses 
After observing the effects of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments and the 
rate of change of policy-related judgments over time, attention was then turned to what 
might account for those effects, specifically the potential role of evaluations of Obama as 
a mediator. As Model 4 provided the most conservative test of the hypotheses, it served 
as the focus of the mediation analyses. Note that there were four relationships of interest 
that could be mediated by evaluations of Obama: (1) explicit racial attitudes or (2) 
implicit racial attitudes predicting perceived direction of the country, and (3) explicit 
attitudes or (4) implicit racial attitudes predicting rate of change of perceived direction of 
the country.  
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Given that, in this model, the main predictor variables of interest and the proposed 
mediator were measured at the upper-level (at the level of the person), while the outcome 
variable was measured at the lower-level (repeated measures within persons), the 
scenario considered is what has been referred to as upper-level mediation (Kenny, Kashy, 
& Bolger, 1998) or a 2  2  1 model (Krull & MacKinnon, 1999, 2001). In this case, it 
was appropriate to test for evidence of mediation by first fitting a series of weighted 
multilevel models to determine the parameter estimates for each of the paths in the 
mediation models of interest (i.e., the total effects, the direct effects, and the indirect 
effects) and then testing the significance of each of the four indirect effects (see Figure 
3). The data analysis plan was as follows: 
Step 1. Fit a multilevel model (Model 4; as described in the previous section) 
regressing perceived direction of the country on implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
Blacks, controlling for the appropriate demographic variables and applying the 
appropriate sampling weight, to obtain the four total effect estimates (̂ _, ̂ _, 
̂_, and ̂_).6 
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In this equation, ".+ represents the total effect of explicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the 
country in May 2009 ( _ path), while ". represents the total effect of implicit racial prejudice on 
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 Step 2. Regress evaluations of Obama on implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
Blacks, controlling for the appropriate demographic variables and applying the 
appropriate sampling weight, to obtain the first (IV  mediator) halves of the indirect 
effects ( and ).7 
Step 3. Fit a multilevel model regressing perceived direction of the country on 
evaluations of Obama, to obtain the second (mediator  DV) halves of the indirect 
effects ( and ), and on explicit and implicit racial attitudes to obtain the four 
direct effect estimates (̂ _L , ̂ _L , ̂_L , and ̂_L ), while controlling for 
the appropriate demographic variables and applying the appropriate sampling weight.8 
                                                                                                                                                                             
perceived direction of the country in May 2009 (_ path). The parameter ".+ represents the total 
effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of the country ( _ path), 
and ". represents the total effect of implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of 
the country (_ path). It was assumed that the within-person residuals were independent and normally 
distributed with a mean 0 and variance , and that the random effects were independent and bivariate 
normally distributed with means of 0, variances of  and , and a covariance of . 
 
 
7Represented by the following equation: 
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In this equation, ".+ represents the effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama ( path), 
and ". represents the effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama ( path). It was 
assumed that the residuals were independent and normally distributed with a mean 0 and variance . 
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Step 4. Test the significance of each of the four proposed mediation effects using 
the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM) via the web utility 
provided by Selig and Preacher (2008). To remind, the MCMAM uses simulated random 
draws from the sampling distributions of  and  to generate a sampling distribution of 
the product of  and  from which a confidence interval for the indirect effect estimate 
can be calculated. If the values within the confidence interval do not include zero, there is 
evidence to support a significant indirect effect. 
Results 
Testing for Racialization and Polarization 
Results for each model fit can be found in Table 2, and for each of the critical 
models (i.e., Models 2, 3, and 4), the same general pattern emerged: Increases in explicit 
and/or increases in implicit racial prejudice significantly predicted higher initial values 
(i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country. For example, 
Model 4 predicted that a 1-unit increase in explicit racial prejudice (i.e., moving from 
maximally positive to maximally negative) resulted, on average, in a .731-unit increase in 
an individual’s initial value of perceived direction, while a 1-unit increase in implicit 
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In this equation, ".4 represents the effect of disapproval of Obama on perceived direction of the country 
in May 2009 ( path), and ".4 represents the effect of disapproval of Obama on the rate of change in 
perceived direction of the country ( path). The parameter ".+ represents the direct effect of explicit 
racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 ( _L  path), and ". represents the 
direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in May 2009 (_L  path). 
The parameter ".+ represents the direct effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived 
direction of the country ( _L  path), and ". represents the direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on 
the rate of change of perceived direction of the country (_L  path). Again, it was assumed that the 
within-person residuals were independent and normally distributed with a mean 0 and variance , and that 
the random effects were independent and bivariate normally distributed with means of 0, variances of  
and , and a covariance of . 
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racial prejudice (i.e., moving from maximally positive to maximally negative) resulted, 
on average, in a .139-unit increase in an individual’s initial value of perceived direction 
(after accounting for the control variables). In other words, for May 2009, the model 
implies that a person who was maximally negative in their explicit and implicit attitudes 
toward Blacks would have rated the country as nearly a point (.87-units) worse than it 
was in January 2009 on the 5-point scale.    
Additionally, across each of the three critical models, increases in explicit and/or 
increases in implicit racial prejudice significantly predicted increases in the rate of 
change of perceived direction (worsening) of the country over time, as represented by the 
time-by-racial attitudes interaction terms (see Figures 4 and 5). (To remind, a single unit 
of time represents two months.) For example, Model 4 predicted that, from May 2009 to 
July 2009, individuals who were maximally positive in their explicit and implicit 
attitudes toward Blacks would slightly improve their evaluations of the country’s 
direction by .064 units (i.e., the main effect of time; after accounting for the control 
variables). For those who were maximally negative, though, Model 4 predicted a .119-
unit increase (= .078 + .041) in the rate of change. In other words, from May 2009 to July 
2009, the model implies that the difference between those who were maximally positive 
and maximally negative in their attitudes toward Blacks would have increased by .183-
units to just over a scale point (1.053 on the 5-point scale).  
In considering the differences in parameter estimates across Models 2, 3, and 4, it 
becomes clear that, when considered simultaneously (Model 4) as opposed to separately 
(Models 2 and 3), both the effects of explicit and implicit prejudice and their 
contributions to the rate of change decreased slightly in magnitude. As explicit and 
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implicit prejudice were significantly correlated (r = .266, p < .0001), these decreases are 
not surprising. Importantly, despite these decreases in magnitude, each measure of 
prejudice remained significant when controlling for the other, demonstrating the unique 
predictive power of both explicit and implicit racial attitudes. 
In considering how much variance was explained by each of these models, the 
traditional R2 used in determining the impact of general linear models is not available in 
multilevel modeling due to the partitioning of variance into different pools, including the 
within-person (residual) variance, the initial status (intercepts) variance, and the growth 
rate (slopes) variance. Therefore, each of these was considered separately, beginning with 
the within-person variance. In looking at the estimates in Table 2, one will note that the 
conditional within-person variance did not change across all the models. This result is not 
surprising, as time was the only Level 1 predictor in the model (i.e., the only variable that 
changed within persons), and therefore the only variable that could explain within-person 
variance.  
In looking at the between-person variance in initial status (or intercepts) 
explained, adding the control variables to the model explained only 4.16% of the variance 
(Model 1), while the inclusion of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes in the model 
increased the amount of variance explained (up to 12.66% total). It is also noteworthy 
that though both types of attitude measures explain additional variance independently, the 
total variance explained with the inclusion of the explicit measure (12.19%) is 
substantially larger than that explained with the inclusion of the implicit measure (6.47%) 
and not substantially different from the total amount of variance explained when both 
explicit and implicit measures are included simultaneously (12.66%). In other words, 
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though the fixed effect of implicit attitudes is significant, explicit attitudes toward Blacks 
seem to be a more powerful predictor of initial values of perceived direction of the 
country than implicit attitudes. 
In looking at the between-person variance in growth rate (or slopes) explained, 
adding the control variables to the model explained only 5.20% of the variance, while the 
inclusion of explicit and/or implicit racial attitudes in the model again explained 
additional variance (up to 16.55% total). As before, both types of attitude measures 
explained additional variance independently, with 13.41% of the total variance explained 
by the inclusion of the explicit measure and 11.80% explained by the inclusion of the 
implicit measure. Unlike with the between-person differences in initial values, in this 
case of the between-person differences in slopes, the total variance explained when both 
measures are included simultaneously is several percentage points higher (16.55%) than 
when either is considered independently. This result suggests that both measures are 
powerful unique predictors of the rate of change of perceived direction of the country. 
Mediation Analyses 
Step 1. Model 4, described previously, served as the focus of the first step in the 
mediation analyses. To remind, it produced positive and significant estimates for each of 
the four parameters of interest (see Table 2 and Figure 3). Increases in explicit and 
increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely predicted higher initial values (i.e., in May 
2009) of perceived direction (worsening) of the country. Additionally, increases in 
explicit and increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely predicted increases in the rate 
of change of perceived direction (worsening) of the country over time. 
40 
 
Step 2. At this second step in the mediation analysis, the model-fitting procedure 
demonstrated positive and significant estimates for both parameters of interest (see Table 
3 and Figure 3). Increases in explicit and increases in implicit racial prejudice uniquely 
predicted higher levels of disapproval of Obama. 
Step 3. At this third step in the mediation analysis, the model-fitting procedure 
produced estimates for both the second half of the indirect effects and the direct effects 
(see Table 4 and Figure 3). Regarding the second half of the indirect effects, increases in 
disapproval of Obama predicted higher initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived 
direction (worsening) of the country and increases in the rate of change of perceived 
direction (worsening) of the country over time. Regarding the direct effects, after 
accounting for the effects of evaluations of Obama, the effects of both explicit and 
implicit racial prejudice on initial values (i.e., in May 2009) of perceived direction 
(worsening) of the country were no longer significant (ps > .535). Further, while the 
direct effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change in perceived 
direction remained (marginally) significant (ps < .097), the effects decreased in 
magnitude after accounting for effects of evaluations of Obama.  
It also is worth noting that the inclusion of evaluations of Obama in the model 
increased the amount of variance explained in both intercepts and slopes to 48.48% and 
30.21%, respectively. 
Step 4. To remind, there were four relationships of interest that could be mediated 
by evaluations of Obama: (1) explicit racial attitudes and (2) implicit racial attitudes 
predicting perceived direction of the country, as well as (3) explicit attitudes and (4) 
implicit racial attitudes predicting rate of change of perceived direction of the country. As 
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the results reported in Table 5 illustrate, for each of these predicted pathways, the indirect 
effect was significant. In other words, none of the confidence intervals obtained via the 
MCMAM procedure contained zero. 
Testing Model Assumptions 
At each step of the mediation analysis and at both the within- and between-person 
levels, it was assumed that the residuals were normally distributed. A visual inspection of 
residual distribution plots for each of the three models fit revealed no flagrant departures 
from normality. It also was assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals at 
all levels of the predictor variables. In order to test this assumption, for all the three 
models fit, scatterplots of the residuals by the predicted values and by the main predictors 
of interest (i.e., explicit and implicit racial attitudes and evaluations of Obama) were 
created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly even distribution of the 
residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was concluded that the analyses 
were consistent with the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. 
Discussion 
This study extended the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating that increases in 
explicit and implicit anti-Black attitudes were predictive of increased levels of perceived 
worsening of the country not only at a single time point, but also over time. Those with 
more negative attitudes toward Blacks prior to the 2008 election were later likely both to 
believe the country was in a worsened position since the start of the Obama 
administration and to become more extreme in those beliefs over time, relative to those 
with more positive attitudes. Further, these relationships between racial attitudes and 
perceived direction of the country were mediated by evaluations of Obama: Those with 
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more negative racial attitudes also evaluated Obama more negatively. Those negative 
evaluations of Obama, in turn, predicted both more negative policy-related judgments 
and increasing relative negativity of those judgments over time.  
It is interesting to note that the implicit measure of prejudice was a stronger 
predictor, in terms of variance explained, of differences in slopes rather than differences 
in intercepts. Explicit prejudice, on the other hand, appeared to explain a substantial 
amount of variance in both. Explicit measures are generally regarded as better predictors 
of deliberate or controlled behaviors such as verbal responses, while implicit measures 
have been shown to be better predictors of spontaneous or uncontrolled behaviors such as 
nonverbal cues (Dovidio et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; 
Hofmann et al., 2008). The greater contribution of the implicit measure to variation in 
slopes suggests that such uncontrolled behaviors may be relatively more impactful as 
attitudes form and change over time. 
Though tests of the key hypotheses did reach statistical significance, some may 
note that the sizes of the effects remained fairly small. For example, as noted previously, 
Model 4 predicted that, after controlling for the demographic variables, the difference in 
policy-related judgments between those who were maximally positive and those who 
were maximally negative in their attitudes toward Blacks increased from just under a 
point (.87 units) on the 5-point scale to just over a point (1.053 units). However, though 
the range of a single scale point may seem relatively insubstantial, the psychological 
difference marked by that point (e.g., between the state of the country being “about the 
same” and “slightly worse”) may be anything but insubstantial. Given the influences of 
public opinion and changes in public opinion on policy-making (see Page & Shapiro, 
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1983; Manza & Cook, 2001), the potential influence of a constituent who perceives the 
country to be remaining steady versus one who perceives declines may be quite 
impactful. Additionally, while a great deal of between-person variance remains 
unexplained by the included predictors, the ability to explain 12-16% of why individuals 
differ in their opinions of the state of the country and why those opinions change over 
time is still important when one considers that these effects are representative of the 
views of the American electorate, a body in which small shifts can have large impacts. 
Limitations 
While the present analysis did provide support for the hypotheses, it was not 
without its limitations. First of all, perceived direction of the country was measured at 
only three time points, the last two being spaced one year apart. The first two years of 
Obama’s presidency were a tumultuous time in U.S. politics, and there were surely many 
variations in general perceptions of how well the country was faring for which these data 
cannot account. Secondly, while the data seemed to support the hypothesis that Obama’s 
unique role as a Black politician has created the connection between racial attitudes and 
policy-related judgments, such a statement would be strengthened if the same pattern of 
relationships was not present in data collected during other presidential administrations. It 
is to this task that attention was then turned. 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY 3: TEST FOR NULL EFFECTS UNDER A PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
Studies 1 and 2 provided strong support for the idea that the U.S.’s first Black 
president has acted as a medium for racializing and polarizing public opinion on a variety 
of nonracial issues. As the mediation analyses demonstrated, the relationship between 
prejudice toward Blacks and perceived worsening of the country was partially explained 
by more negative evaluations of Obama. Further, the non-significance of evaluations of 
Hillary Clinton as a mediator of the relationship between these two seemingly disparate 
sets of attitudes suggests that the effect cannot be generalized to prominent Democratic 
politicians. However, it was assumed to this point that, independent of the current 
political context, attitudes toward Blacks should not be expected to predict one’s stance 
on, for example, the state of the nation’s economy. In other words, that these policy-
related issues (e.g., the economy) are typically nonracial issues (i.e., not informed by 
one’s racial attitudes) was a hypothesis that remained to be tested. Further, the 
interpretation of the previously reported results, particularly the emphasis on the unique 
role of Obama as the nation’s first Black president, would be bolstered by demonstrating 
that the observed set of relationships—racial attitudes predicting policy-related 
judgments as mediated by evaluations of the president—was not present in data collected 
during previous presidential administrations. 
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Therefore, a third analysis was conducted to assess the same pattern of results 
utilizing data collected during the administration of former President George W. Bush. It 
was hypothesized that, after controlling for various demographic measures (e.g., gender, 
education, etc.), (1) there would be a non-significant correlation between racial attitudes 
and policy-related judgments; and (2) there would be a non-significant indirect effect of 
racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Bush 
(Hypothesis 1c). 
Method 
Respondents and Sampling 
The sample for this analysis was drawn from both the ANES 2000 and 2002 Time 
Series Studies. The respondents in these studies were a representative sample of the 
American electorate at the time, and the data have been weighted to reflect then-current 
population demographics. Some respondents were selected by traditional area probability 
sampling and interviewed face-to-face, while others were recruited using random digit 
dialing and interviewed by telephone. Informed consent was obtained from all 
respondents, and they were compensated for their time. (For comprehensive information 
on the sampling and recruitment techniques for these studies, please see 
www.electionstudies.org.) The final available sample size for this analysis was 1,040 
respondents. 
Measurements 
Outcome variable. The construct of policy-related judgments was 
operationalized using measures of perceived direction of the country taken from the 2002 
pre-election interviews (conducted September-November 2002). Respondents were asked 
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to evaluate the current state of the nation’s economy and its current position in the world 
as compared to the previous year. The former was assessed on a 5-point scale (1 = much 
better, 5 = much worse), and the latter was assessed on a 3-point scale (1 = weaker, 3 = 
stronger; reverse scored).9 (Question wordings and all response options can be found in 
Appendix B.) Both responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected perceived 
worsening of the country, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a composite 
variable (weighted M = 0.60, SD = 0.26; r = .28, p < .0001).  
Predictor variable. The primary predictor of interest was a measure of explicit 
attitudes toward Blacks taken from the 2000 post-election interviews (conducted 
November-December 2000). (A measure of implicit attitudes toward Blacks was 
unavailable in this dataset.) Participants responded to a variety of items assessing the 
underlying construct of explicit attitudes toward Blacks including: a single-item measure 
of feelings toward Blacks (0 = cold/disliking, 100 = warm/liking); a single-item measure 
of perceptions that Blacks have too much political influence (1 = too much influence, 3 = 
too little influence); and three items assessing racial stereotypes of Blacks (e.g., 1 = 
hardworking, 7 = lazy).10 (Question wordings and all response options can be found in 
Appendix B.) All responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected more 
negative attitudes toward Blacks, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a 
composite variable (weighted M = 0.43, SD = 0.17; α = 0.67). 
                                                          
9Some may note that the questions afforded by these surveys for assessing the construct of “perceived 
direction of the country” were slightly different from and perhaps less ideal than those used in the previous 
analyses. Though the reliability of this scale was quite low (α = 0.37), it nevertheless provided the best 
opportunity afforded by older ANES data sets to compare the pattern of relationships observed in the 
Obama administration to those of a previous administration. 
 
10Note that this explicit prejudice composite did not include the four items from Kinder and Sanders’ 
(1996) Racial Resentment Scale as originally proposed. This alteration was made in order to better 
approximate the measure of explicit prejudice used in previous analyses. 
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Mediator variable. The potential mediator variable was a measure of evaluations 
of former President George W. Bush taken from the 2002 pre-election interviews 
(conducted September-November 2002). Participants responded to a variety of measures 
assessing the underlying construct of evaluations of Bush including: a single-item 
measure of feelings toward him (0 = cold/disliking, 100 = warm/liking) and four 
measures of job approval (i.e., approval of the way Bush is handling his job as president, 
the economy, foreign relations, and the war on terrorism; 1 = strongly approve, 4 = 
strongly disapprove). (Question wordings and all response options can be found in 
Appendix B.) All responses were scored such that higher numbers reflected more 
disapproval of Bush, standardized to a 0-1 scale, and averaged to create a composite 
variable (weighted M = 0.36, SD = 0.30; α = 0.91). 
Control variables. In order to test the unique effects of explicit and implicit 
racial attitudes on perceived direction of the country, a number of demographic control 
variables were included in subsequent analyses. These included: 
1. Gender: This measurement was dummy-coded such that 0 represented males and 
1 represented females. 
2. Level of education: This measurement was assessed in the 2000 pre-election 
survey. It was coded such that there are five dummy-coded categories: less than 
high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and graduate 
work. Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than high 
school,” which served as the reference group. 
3. Income: This measurement was assessed in the 2000 pre-election survey and 
represented the respondent’s income rather than total household income. It was 
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coded such that there were five dummy-coded categories: less than $25,000, 
$25,000-74,999, $75,000-114,999, $115,000-$149,999, and more than $150,000. 
Each of these was entered into the model, except for “less than $25,000,” which 
served as the reference group. 
4. Age: This measurement refers to the participant’s age at the time of the 2000 
election. Given that the minimum voting age is 18, it was recoded such that 0 
represented an 18-year old. 
Sampling Weights 
This analysis utilized sampling weights provided by ANES, which are intended to 
correct for unequal probabilities of selection and nonresponse bias. Specifically, the 2002 
pre-election weight was used, because it is applicable to the use of data collected through 
the 2002 pre-election interviews, and is therefore most appropriate for the data to be used 
in this analysis. 
Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that there was a non-significant correlation between 
racial attitudes and policy-related judgments during the early years of President George 
W. Bush’s administration, perceived direction of the country was regressed on explicit 
attitudes toward Blacks, as well as the full set of control variables, with the selected 
weight applied. Contrary to the first hypothesis, explicit prejudice did significantly 
predict perceived direction of the country (B = -0.15, SE = 0.05, t = -3.10, p = .002). 
Specifically, a more negative attitude toward Blacks was predictive of more positive 
policy-related judgments under this previous presidential administration.  
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In order to test the hypothesis that there was a non-significant indirect effect of 
racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations of Bush, two 
additional weighted regression analyses were conducted and then the Monte Carlo 
Method for Assessing Mediation (MCMAM; Selig & Preacher, 2009) was utilized to test 
the significance of the indirect effect. When evaluations of Bush was regressed on 
explicit attitudes and the full set of control variables and appropriately weighted, explicit 
prejudice was found to be significantly predictive of more positive evaluations of Bush 
(B = -0.37, SE = 0.06, t = -6.86, p < .0001). Thus, those who held more negative attitudes 
toward Blacks were more likely to evaluate Bush positively. When perceived direction of 
the country was regressed on explicit attitudes, evaluations of Bush, and the full set of 
control variables and appropriately weighted, explicit prejudice was no longer a 
significant predictor of perceived direction of the country (B = 0.03, SE = 0.04, t = 0.72, p 
= 0.47), while evaluations of Bush was significantly predictive of perceived direction of 
the country (B = 0.47, SE = 0.02, t = 20.64, p < .0001). In other words, while explicit 
attitudes toward Blacks were no longer associated with policy-related judgments, those 
with more negative evaluations of Bush were also likely to report more negative policy-
related judgments. Using 20,000 repetitions for the simulation, the MCMAM procedure 
indicated that the indirect effect of explicit attitudes toward Blacks on perceived direction 
of the country through evaluations of Bush was significant with a point estimate of -0.18 
and a 95% confidence interval of -0.23 to -0.13. 
Testing Model Assumptions 
In fitting the models necessary for this analysis, it was assumed that the residuals 
were normally distributed. A visual inspection of residual distribution plots for each of 
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the three regression models fit revealed no flagrant departures from normality. It also was 
assumed that there was a constant variance in the residuals. In order to test this 
assumption, scatterplots of both sets of residuals by the predicted values and by the main 
predictors of interest (i.e., explicit racial attitudes and evaluations of Bush, as 
appropriate) were created. A visual inspection of these plots revealed a fairly even 
distribution of the residuals across all values of the predictor. Therefore, it was concluded 
that the analyses were consistent with the assumptions of normality and 
homoscedasticity. 
Discussion 
Evaluating these results in terms of the strictest stated hypotheses, one can see 
that they are not directly supported. Contrary to expectations, there was a significant 
relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments and a significant 
indirect effect of racial attitudes on policy-related judgments as mediated by evaluations 
of Bush. However, the nature of the relationship between racial attitudes and policy-
related judgments was opposite in valence for the Obama administration (Studies 1 and 
2) as compared to the Bush administration. In the case of Obama, the more negative 
one’s attitude toward Blacks, the worse one perceived the country to be doing; while 
during the Bush administration, the more negative one’s attitude toward Blacks, the 
better one perceived the country to be doing. Thus, though Obama may not be unique in 
mediating this significant relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related 
judgments, he may be unique in the particular pattern of mediation. It is only with Obama 
that negative racial attitudes negatively impacted policy-related judgments. 
  
CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
The findings reported here suggest that, rather than having ushered in a post-racial 
era in American history, the election of Barack Obama may have had the opposite effect, 
infusing purportedly race-neutral policy issues with negative racial undertones. Study 1 
confirmed that those with stronger anti-Black attitudes before the 2008 election voiced 
more negative policy-related judgments in July 2009 and that this racialization of policy-
related issues was mediated by more negative evaluations of Obama. Study 2 
demonstrated that the differences in policy-related judgments between those with more 
positive and more negative attitudes toward Blacks was increasing over time between 
May 2009 and July 2010 and that this polarization was mediated by more negative 
evaluations of Obama. Study 3 suggested that, though racial attitudes have been 
predictive of policy-related judgments under a previous presidential administration, the 
particular pattern of mediation—specifically, the positive correlation between explicit 
anti-Black prejudice and disapproval of the president—may be unique to the Obama 
administration.  
Two points bear repeating: First, all three studies utilized nationally representative 
samples of the American electorate and have been weighted to reflect then-current 
population demographics. This fact allows for much greater confidence than is afforded 
by convenience sampling that the population about which inferences are being made is 
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indeed the whole of American voters and that the effects observed were, and perhaps 
continue to be, impactful at the national level. Second, the policy-related judgments 
outcome measure assessed respondents’ views on a variety of issues (e.g., the economy) 
that, on the face of it, should be uninfluenced by racial attitudes. And yet, the ability of 
racial attitudes to predict how respondents viewed the country’s direction was a robust 
finding across all three studies. In short, despite the hopes that were pinned on him by 
many, Obama has not signaled the beginning of a post-racial era in American history.  
These findings have broad applied and theoretical implications, three of which 
will be discussed here, including how these results speak to the racialization of non-racial 
policy issues, the prolonged impact of racial attitudes on political attitudes, and the 
predictive validity of implicit measures. Firstly, these findings seem to lend some 
credence to the frequently heard assertion that criticisms of President Obama and his 
policies are rooted in racism. Those with more negative attitudes toward Blacks before 
the 2008 election were more likely to believe that the country had worsened during the 
early years of the Obama administration, and this effect was driven, in part, by more 
negative evaluations of Obama. In other words, when former Republican National 
Committee Chairman Michael Steele said, “This isn’t about race. It is about policy,” he 
was only half right. It is about policy differences, and it is about race. Policy views, in the 
age of Obama, are partially informed by racial attitudes and the effect of those attitudes 
on evaluations of the nation’s first Black president. These results are consistent with 
existing research on the influence of prejudicial attitudes in person perception (e.g., 
Lepore & Brown, 1997; Gawronski et al., 2003) and theories of evaluative and cognitive 
consistency (e.g., Heider, 1946, 1958): Those with higher levels of anti-Black prejudice 
53 
 
may be more likely to access and apply negative racial stereotypes when encountering 
information about President Obama, and having formed a negative impression of him, the 
need for consistency dictates that those individuals would also more negatively evaluate 
Obama’s actions and policy positions. That racial attitudes would be expressed as policy-
related attitudes is also consistent with the predictions of aversive racism theory 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004): It may be that the desire to 
suppress any displays of overt racism leads some members of the American electorate to 
channel their negative feelings toward the nation’s first Black president into more 
socially acceptable criticisms, such as disapproval of the policies with which he is 
strongly associated (e.g., health care reform).  
Secondly, the observed increase in the difference of public opinion between those 
with more positive and those with more negative attitudes toward Blacks is striking not 
only in that it confirms what many have speculated about growing polarization in the 
American electorate, but also in that it can be explained, in part, by the prolonged impact 
of racial attitudes on political attitudes. To remind, in the Study 2 analyses, it was shown 
that attitudes toward Blacks measured in September and October 2008 predicted not only 
individuals’ judgments about how the country was faring months later, but also how 
those judgments were changing over the course of a 14-month period. The lengthy 
timeframe over which these findings extend is quite remarkable when one considers the 
number of intervening events that potentially could have weakened the ability of the 
racial attitudes measures to predict subsequent judgments. Between September 2008 (the 
time at which the first racial attitudes measures were taken) and May 2009 (the time at 
which evaluations of Obama and the first policy-related judgment measures were taken), 
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Barack Obama was elected to and assumed the presidency; ordered the closure of the 
Guantánamo Bay prison; outlined his energy policy; signed into law the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act; met with various foreign leaders including former 
British prime minister Gordon Brown, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, and 
members of the Turkish parliament; and gifted his young daughters with a dog they 
named Bo. In that same time period, throughout the U.S., people were grappling with 
record high unemployment, government bail-outs of large corporations, the growing 
threat of the swine flu public health emergency, and a public debate over same-sex 
marriage.  
These non-exhaustive lists are meant simply to illustrate the sheer number of 
intervening events happening at the national level, not to mention the many personal and 
local factors, that could have informed respondents’ judgments about the direction of the 
country. One might naively assume that, with the passage of time and Obama’s 
prominence on the national stage, members of the American electorate would update 
their opinions of him such that more recent events overshadowed the impact of his race. 
And yet, explicit and implicit attitudes toward Blacks continued to be a strong predictor 
of public opinion. These findings are consistent with the predictions of social judgment 
theory (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993): It may be that racially informed evaluations of 
Obama were leading to biased construals of subsequent information about him such that 
the original evaluations were not only reinforced but strengthened such that they became 
more extreme. And, given the robust link between evaluations of Obama and policy-
related judgments, it is to be expected that judgments of how the country is faring would 
follow the same polarizing path. Viewed from this perspective, if racial attitudes served 
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as a key factor in establishing initial attitudes toward Obama, they would, in a sense, 
influence every subsequent evaluation as well, making it perhaps less surprising that 
these measures would maintain their strength and be able to predict the trajectory of a 
political attitude over time. 
Thirdly, Studies 1 and 2 are noteworthy in that they address frequently expressed 
concerns regarding and further establish the unique predictive validity of implicit 
measures. Across both studies, an implicit measure of prejudice—the affect 
misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005)—predicted the same patterns of 
effects as an explicit measure of prejudice: higher initial levels of perceived worsening of 
the country and increased worsening over time. Further, it remained a significant 
predictor even when controlling for explicit prejudice. In other words, an implicit 
measure contributed a unique, additive effect above and beyond an explicit measure in 
predicting policy-related judgments and the polarized pattern of change of those 
judgments over time. Though some critics (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Tetlock & 
Mitchell, 2008) have questioned the value of implicit measures, the findings reported 
here provide additional confirmation that implicit measures are not inferior to explicit 
ones in capturing “real” prejudice. They have once again been shown to be predictive of a 
consequential real-world behavior, as these effects were observed in a representative 
sample of the American electorate and on the meaningful outcome measure of public 
opinion (see Page & Shapiro, 1983; Manza & Cook, 2001). Further, given that implicit 
measures capture additional variance not explained by explicit measures and are not 
subject to the same self-presentational concerns and lack of introspective access that can 
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dilute explicit measures, they may be considered even more appropriate than explicit 
measures for the exploration of socially sensitive topics such as prejudice.  
In addition to addressing these concerns over whether implicit measures predict 
meaningful discriminatory behaviors, these findings also inform existing social cognitive 
theoretical models. As mentioned previously, past research has demonstrated that explicit 
and implicit measures of prejudice predict different types of social behavior. Explicit 
measures have been shown to predict deliberate or controlled behaviors, while implicit 
measures have been better predictors of spontaneous or uncontrolled behaviors (Dovidio 
et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Hofmann et al., 2008). 
However, in these studies, it was shown that both explicit and implicit measures of 
prejudice independently and uniquely predicted policy-related judgments, which suggests 
that political attitudes are jointly driven by two types of processes, some of which are 
subject to the individual’s conscious control and others that are not. And, when one 
considers the messiness of the real world—the myriad contributions to one’s attitudes, 
the news sources sought or shunned, the conversations initiated or avoided and with 
whom, and so on—it makes intuitive sense that both conscious intentions and unchecked 
impulses ultimately would be decisive influences on one’s attitudes and how they could 
be expected to change over time. 
Future Directions 
 One avenue of future research is to explore the role of potential moderators in the 
relationship between racial attitudes and policy-related judgments. Certain individual 
difference variables, such as political party affiliation, have been excluded from the 
present analyses in hopes of providing the most straightforward test of the racialization 
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and polarization hypotheses. However, it may be that the effects of racial prejudice on 
political attitudes are augmented for some people. For example, perhaps those who did 
not strongly identify with a political party prior to the 2008 election were more likely to 
be influenced by their racial attitudes in evaluating Obama and his policies than those 
who did strongly identify with a party and were, therefore, more likely to view him 
through the lens of political affiliation. Such analyses would be interesting not only from 
an applied perspective, but also in their ability to inform existing social cognitive theory, 
particularly if the unique effects of potential moderators on both explicit and implicit 
measures of prejudice are considered. Further, the incorporation of such individual 
difference variables into the multilevel models may provide an opportunity to explain 
additional between-person variance in intercepts and slopes that is not accounted for by 
the current set of demographic control and racial attitudes variables. 
An additional outstanding question remains whether the differences in effects 
observed in data collected during the Obama versus Bush administrations might be 
attributed alternatively to the differences in views toward a Democratic and a Republican 
administration, respectively. Though the non-significant effect of Clinton (Study 1) 
makes this alternative interpretation less likely, it may be that Clinton’s role as Secretary 
of State in the Obama administration was not viewed by the American electorate as 
powerful enough to effect the direction of the country, thereby precluding her from 
serving a mediating role. Therefore, future research should explore whether a White 
Democratic presidential administration (e.g., that of former President Bill Clinton) 
presents a pattern of relationships among racial attitudes, presidential evaluations, and 
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policy-related judgments that is more similar to that of the Obama administration or the 
Bush administration. 
 Finally, given the polarization findings and what they suggest about the prolonged 
impact of racial attitudes on political attitudes, it would be worthwhile to explore whether 
a recursive function exists between racial and political attitudes. It may be that while 
racial attitudes are influencing evaluations of Obama and his policies, those political 
judgments are in turn influencing subsequent racial attitudes. In other words, we know 
that attitudes toward Blacks are influencing how one views Obama; but, are evaluations 
of Obama feeding back into and influencing how one feels toward Blacks in general? An 
analysis that simultaneously accounted for changes in racial attitudes and evaluations of 
Obama and his administration’s governance would best be able to address such a 
question and inform our understanding of the seemingly blurred boundary between racial 
and political attitudes in the current context. 
  
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
These findings suggest that racial attitudes have continued to play a substantial 
role in today’s political climate. The unique racial lens through which President Obama is 
viewed has allowed the racial attitudes of the American electorate to inform not only how 
they evaluate the president, but also their views of how they are being governed. Further, 
these racial attitudes appear to be driving increasing polarization of the American 
electorate, as those who differ in their racial attitudes also grow more and more divergent 
in their opinions of how the country is faring. Critically, these effects were observed 
independently for both explicit and implicit measures of prejudice, which suggests that 
racial attitudes may be influencing political judgments at two levels: in ways that are both 
carefully considered and uncontrolled by those who hold them. 
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TABLES 
 
Perceived Direction 
(Worsening) of the Country N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
May 2009 2133 3.57 0.58 
July 2009 1971 3.56 0.60 
July 2010 1281 3.59 0.76 
 
Table 1. Average values (on a 5-point scale) for perceived direction of the country at each 
time point included in Study 2. 
  
61 
 
 
Null Model Growth Model 
Model 1 
Controls 
Only 
Model 2 
Explicit and 
Controls 
Model 3 
Implicit and 
Controls 
Model 4 
Both and 
Controls 
Fixed effect 
estimates:       
Intercept 3.573* 3.567* 3.624* 3.189* 3.549* 3.18* 
Time  .003 -.015 -.066* -.027 -.064* 
Explicit 
prejudice    .793*  .731* 
Time x Explicit    .096*  .078* 
Implicit 
prejudice     .297* .139* 
Time x Implicit     .058* .041* 
Random effects:       
Within-person 
variance estimate 
(Level 1 
residuals),   
.154*a .123* .123* .123* .123* .123* 
Initial value 
(intercepts), ̂ .245*
ab
 .216* .207* .189* .202* .188* 
Growth rate 
(slopes), ̂  .003* .003* .002* .002* .002* 
Covariance 
among the 
intercepts and 
slopes, ̂ 
 .008* .008* .006* .007* .005* 
Variance 
Explained:       
Within-person 
variancec  20.13% 20.13% 20.20% 20.11% 20.17% 
Initial value 
(intercepts), ̂d   4.16% 12.19% 6.47% 12.66% 
Growth rate 
(slopes), ̂ d   5.20% 13.41% 11.80% 16.55% 
* p < .05 
a
 These variance estimates are 
unconditional, i.e., not contingent on any 
predictor variables. 
b
 This estimate represents the total between-
person variance. 
c
 As compared to the null model. 
d
 As compared to the unconditional growth 
model. 
 
Table 2. Study 2 results of weighted multilevel models assessing predictors for perceived 
direction of the country and the rate of change of perceived direction of the country. 
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 Model Fit in Step 2 of 
Mediation Analyses 
Parameter Estimates  
Model-implied average disapproval of Obama .106* 
Effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama .554*** 
Effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama .089** 
 
Table 3. Study 2 mediation analysis, Step 2 results. Regression analysis simultaneously 
assessing the effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice on evaluations of Obama. 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .0001 
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Outcome: Perceived Direction (Worsening) of the Country Model Fit in Step 3 of Mediation Analyses 
Fixed effect estimates:  
Intercept 3.062*** 
Time -.075** 
Explicit prejudice .055 
Time x Explicit .034 
Implicit prejudice .025 
Time x Implicit .030* 
Evaluations of Obama 1.22*** 
Time x Obama .083*** 
 
 
Random effects:  
Within-person variance estimate (Level 1 residuals),   .123* 
Initial value (intercepts), ̂ .111* 
Growth rate (slopes), ̂ .002* 
Covariance among the intercepts and slopes, ̂ .0001 
 
 
Variance Explained: 
 
Within-person variance 19.97% 
Initial value (intercepts), ̂ 48.48% 
Growth rate (slopes), ̂ 30.21% 
 
Table 4. Study 2 mediation analysis, Step 3 results. Multilevel model simultaneously 
assessing the effects of explicit and implicit racial prejudice and evaluations of Obama, as 
well as the full set of control variables, on perceived direction (worsening) of the country. 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .0001 
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Indirect Effects 
Point 
estimate 
(NO x PQ)   
95% Confidence Interval 
Of explicit racial prejudice on initial 
value of perceived direction via 
evaluations of Obama 
0.6763 0.5546 0.8025 
Of implicit racial prejudice on 
initial value of perceived direction 
via evaluations of Obama 
0.1089 0.03862 0.1807 
Of explicit racial prejudice on rate 
of change of perceived direction via 
evaluations of Obama 
0.0460 0.031 0.06183 
Of implicit racial prejudice on rate 
of change of perceived direction via 
evaluations of Obama 
0.0074 0.002501 0.01317 
 
 
Table 5: Study 2 tests of indirect effects. 
  
Figure 1: Study 1 mediation analysis assessing the impact of racial attitudes on policy
related judgments via evaluations of Obama. Parentheses contain the standard error 
* 
 
Explicit:  = .56*** (.03) 
Implicit:  = .11*** (.02) 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
estimates.  
p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .0001 
 
Explicit:  = .98*** (.08) 
                = .24** (.08) 
 
Implicit:  = .20** (.06) 
                = .05 (.05) 
 
 
-
 = 1.33*** (.05) 
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Figure 2. Sample of individual model-implied trajectories for perceived direction of the 
country responses over time. 
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Time -- 2-Month Intervals Beginning May 2009
Element Interpretation 
 
The total (direct) effect of explicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in 
May 2009 
 
The direct effect of explicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of
the country 
 
The total (direct) effect of implicit racial prejudice on perceived direction of the country in 
May 2009 
 
The direct effect of implicit racial prejudice on the rate of change of perceived direction of 
the country 
 The effect of explicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama
 The effect of implicit racial prejudice on disapproval of Obama
 
The effect of disapproval of Obama on perceived direction of the country in May 2009
 
The effect of disapproval of Obama on the rate of change in perceived direction of the 
country 
Figure 3. Study 2 mediation model
simultaneous influence of explicit and implicit racial attitudes on perceived direction 
(worsening) of the country via evaluations of Obama. Parentheses contain the standard 
error estimates.  
Total Effects:  Direct Effects:
 = .731*** (.100) 
 = .078*** (.019) 
 = .139* (.066) 
 = .041** (.015) 
 = 
 = .089
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. Results reported correspond to Model 4 assessing the 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .0001 
 
 = .055 (.090) 
 = .034 (.020) 
 = .025 (.057) 
 = .030* (.014) 
.554*** (.044) 
** (.029) 
 = 1.22
 = .083
 
 
 
 
*** (.059) 
*** (.013) 
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Figure 4. Conditional simple slopes for perceived direction of the country over time at 
three levels of explicit prejudice: high (+1 SD), medium (mean), and low (-1 SD). Based 
on Study 2, Model 4 estimates. 
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Figure 5. Conditional simple slopes for perceived direction of the country over time at 
three levels of implicit prejudice: high (+1 SD), medium (mean), and low (-1 SD). Based 
on Study 2, Model 4 estimates. 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY ITEMS DRAWN FROM THE ANES 2008-2009 PANEL 
STUDY AND ANES 2010 RECONTACT STUDY 
 
Outcome Variable – Perceived Direction of the Country: 
• Compared to January 2009, would you say the following is now (much better, 
somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse / much worse, 
somewhat worse, about the same, somewhat better, or much better)? 
(Note: The orders of items and response options were randomized.) 
 
__ Much better [1] 
__ Somewhat better [2] 
__ About the same [3] 
__ Somewhat worse [4] 
__ Much worse [5] 
 
Target of Judgment 
Our relations with foreign countries 
The federal budget deficit 
Health care in the U.S. 
Poverty in the U.S. 
 
• Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that as 
compared to January 2009, the nation's economy is now better, about the same, or 
worse? 
 
__ Better [1] 
  Much better or somewhat better? 
__ Much better [1] 
__ Somewhat better [2] 
 
__ About the same [2] 
 
__ Worse [3] 
  Much worse or somewhat worse? 
__ Much worse [1] 
__ Somewhat worse [2] 
 
 
Predictor Variable – Explicit Attitudes toward Blacks: 
• Do you feel warm, cold, or neither warm nor cold toward blacks (whites)? 
 
__ Warm [1] 
Do you feel (extremely warm, moderately warm, or a little warm / a little 
warm, moderately warm, or extremely warm) toward blacks (whites)? 
__ Extremely warm [1] 
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__ Moderately warm [2] 
__ A little warm [3] 
 
__ Cold [2] 
Do you feel (extremely cold, moderately cold, or a little cold / a little cold, 
moderately cold, or extremely cold) toward blacks (whites)? 
__ Extremely cold [1] 
__ Moderately cold [2] 
__ A little cold [3] 
 
__ Neither warm nor cold [3] 
  
• How often have you felt sympathy for blacks? (Always, most of the time, about half 
the time, once in a while, or never / Never, once in a while, about half the time, most 
of the time, or always)? 
 
__ Always [1] 
__ Most of the time [2] 
__ About half the time [3] 
__ Once in a while [4] 
__ Never [5] 
 
• How often have you felt admiration for blacks? (Always, most of the time, about half 
the time, once in a while, or never / Never, once in a while, about half the time, most 
of the time, or always)? 
 
__ Always [1] 
__ Most of the time [2] 
__ About half the time [3] 
__ Once in a while [4] 
__ Never [5] 
 
• Would you say that blacks have too much influence in American politics, just about 
the right amount of influence in American politics, or too little influence in American 
politics? (R) 
 
__ Too much influence [1] 
__ Just about the right amount of influence [2] 
__ Too little influence [3] 
 
 
Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Obama: 
• Do you like Barack Obama, dislike him, or neither like nor dislike him? 
 
__ Like [1] 
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Do you like him (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a 
moderate amount, or a great deal)? 
__ A great deal [1] 
__ A moderate amount [2] 
__ A little [3] 
 
__ Dislike [2] 
Do you dislike him (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a 
moderate amount, or a great deal)? 
__ A great deal [1] 
__ A moderate amount [2] 
__ A little [3] 
 
__ Neither like nor dislike [3] 
 
• When you think about Barack Obama, how (emotional response) does he make you 
feel? (Extremely (emotional response), very (emotional response), moderately 
(emotional response), slightly (emotional response), or not (emotional response) at 
all? / Not (emotional response) at all, slightly (emotional response), moderately 
(emotional response), very (emotional response), or extremely (emotional response)?) 
 
__ Extremely (emotional response) [1] 
__ Very (emotional response) [2] 
__ Moderately (emotional response) [3] 
__ Slightly (emotional response) [4] 
__ Not (emotional response) at all [5] 
 
Emotional Responses 
Angry (R) 
Hopeful 
Afraid (R) 
Proud 
 
• Are you happy, unhappy, or neither happy nor unhappy that Barack Obama won the 
election for President? 
 
__ Happy [1] 
Are you (extremely happy, moderately happy, or slightly happy / slightly 
happy, moderately happy, or extremely happy) that Barack Obama won the 
election for President? 
__ Extremely happy [1] 
__ Moderately happy [2] 
__ Slightly happy [3] 
 
__ Unhappy [2] 
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Are you (extremely unhappy, moderately unhappy, or slightly unhappy / 
slightly unhappy, moderately unhappy, or extremely unhappy) that Barack 
Obama won the election for president? 
__ Extremely unhappy [1] 
__ Moderately unhappy [2] 
__ Slightly unhappy [3] 
 
__ Neither happy nor unhappy [3] 
 
• Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way Barack 
Obama is handling (target item)? 
 
__ Approve [1] 
Do you approve (extremely strongly, moderately strongly, or slightly strongly 
/ slightly strongly, moderately strongly, or extremely strongly)? 
__ Extremely strongly [1] 
__ Moderately strongly [2] 
__ Slightly strongly [3] 
 
__ Disapprove [2] 
Do you disapprove (extremely strongly, moderately strongly, or slightly 
strongly / slightly strongly, moderately strongly, or extremely strongly)? 
__ Extremely strongly [1] 
__ Moderately strongly [2] 
__ Slightly strongly [3] 
 
__ Neither approve nor disapprove [3] 
 
Target of Judgment 
His job as president 
The economy 
Our relations with foreign countries 
The federal government’s budget deficit 
The war in Iraq 
The effort to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks in the United States 
The war in Afghanistan 
Education in the U.S. 
Health care in the U.S. 
The environment 
 
 
Alternative Potential Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Hillary Clinton: 
• Do you like Hillary Clinton, dislike her, or neither like nor dislike her? 
 
__ Like [1] 
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Do you like her (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a 
moderate amount, or a great deal)? 
__ A great deal [1] 
__ A moderate amount [2] 
__ A little [3] 
 
__ Dislike [2] 
Do you dislike her (a great deal, a moderate amount, or a little / a little, a 
moderate amount, or a great deal)? 
__ A great deal [1] 
__ A moderate amount [2] 
__ A little [3] 
 
__ Neither like nor dislike [3] 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY ITEMS DRAWN FROM THE ANES 2000 AND 2002 
TIME SERIES STUDIES 
 
 
Outcome Variable – Perceived Direction of the Country: 
• Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over 
the past year the nation's economy has gotten BETTER, STAYED ABOUT THE 
SAME, or gotten WORSE? 
 
1. Better 
3. Same 
5. Worse 
D. Don't Know 
R. Refused 
 
o (Would you say) MUCH [better/worse] or SOMEWHAT [better/ worse]? 
 
1. Much Better 
2. Somewhat Better 
4. Somewhat Worse 
5. Much Worse 
D. Don't Know 
R. Refused 
 
• Turning to some other issues facing the country. During the past year, would you say 
that the United States' position in the world has grown WEAKER, STAYED ABOUT 
THE SAME, or has it grown STRONGER? 
 
1. Weaker 
3. Stayed about the Same 
5. Stronger 
D. Don't Know 
R. Refused 
 
 
Predictor Variable – Explicit Attitudes toward Blacks: 
• I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who 
are in the news these days. I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that 
person using something we call the feeling thermometer. The feeling thermometer 
can rate people from 0 to 100 degrees. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees 
mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees 
and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person. Rating the 
person at the midpoint, the 50 degree mark, means you don’t feel particularly warm 
or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don’t recognize, 
you don’t need to rate that person. Just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one... 
Still using the thermometer, how would you rate Blacks? 
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• Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and 
politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as 
they deserve. I am going to read you a list of groups, for each one please tell me 
whether that group has too much influence, just about the right amount of influence 
or too little influence… What about Blacks? Would you say they have too much 
influence, just about the right amount of influence, or too little influence? 
 
• Assessing Racial Stereotypes 
o Imagine a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the people in a 
group can be rated. In the first question a score of 1 means that you think 
almost all of the people in that group tend to be “hard-working.” A score of 7 
means that you think most people in the group are “lazy.” A score of 4 means 
that you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the 
other, and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would 
you rate blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates hard working, 7 means 
lazy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the other.) 
 
1 Hardworking 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Lazy 
8 Don’t Know 
 
o Again, please imagine a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of the 
people in a group can be rated. A score of 1 means that you think almost all of 
the people in that group tend to be “intelligent.” A score of 7 means that you 
think most people in the group are “unintelligent.” A score of 4 means that 
you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, 
and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would you rate 
blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates intelligent, 7 means 
unintelligent, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the 
other.) 
 
1 Intelligent 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Unintelligent 
8 Don’t Know 
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o Thinking about trustworthiness as a general group characteristic, please 
imagine a seven point scale again. A score of 1 means that you think almost 
all of the people in that group tend to be trustworthy. A score of 7 means that 
you think most people in the group are untrustworthy. A score of 4 means that 
you think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, 
and of course, you may choose any number in between. Where would you rate 
blacks on a scale of 1 to 7? (where 1 indicates trustworthy, 7 means 
untrustworthy, and 4 indicates most blacks are not closer to one end or the 
other.) 
 
1 Trustworthy 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Untrustworthy 
8 Don’t Know 
 
 
Potential Mediator Variable – Evaluations of Bush 
• Do you APPROVE or DISAPPROVE of the way George W. Bush is HANDLING 
(target of judgment)? 
 
1. Approve 
5. Disapprove 
D. Don't Know 
R. Refused 
 
o (Do you [approve/disapprove]) STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY? 
1. Strongly 
5. Not Strongly 
D. Don't Know 
R. Refused 
 
Target of Judgment 
His job as president 
Our relations with foreign countries 
The economy 
The war on terrorism 
 
• I'd like to get your feelings toward some people in the news these days. I'll read the 
name of a person and I'll ask you to rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 
0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the 
person. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person. 
Rating right at the 50 degree mark means you don't feel particularly warm or cold. 
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You may use any number from 0 to 100 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your 
feelings are. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, just tell me and 
we'll move on to the next one. The first person is: George W. Bush.  Where on that 
thermometer would you rate George W. Bush? 
 
0-100. 
997. Don't Recognize 
998. Don't Know where to rate 
R. Refused 
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